Silvio Berlusconi's party of only children: the organizational model of Forza Italia by Mariotti, Claudia

Documentos de Trabajo 
POLÍTICA Y GESTIÓN 
 
EDITA 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Instituto de Política y Gobernanza (IPOLGOB)   
Departamento de Ciencia Política y Sociología 
Área de Ciencia Política y de la Administración 
 
CONSEJO EDITORIAL 
José Ignacio Cases Méndez 
Ester García Sánchez 
Manuel Hidalgo Trenado 
Antonio Natera Peral 
Javier Redondo Rodelas 
Constanza Tobío Soler 
Francisco J. Vanaclocha Bellver 
Verónica Viñas Chiappini 
Isabel Wences Simón 
 
Documentos de Trabajo Política y Gestión en internet:  
http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/dspace/handle/10016/587 
 
Distribución gratuita, salvo ediciones especiales.  
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Departamento de Ciencia Política y Sociología 
Campus de Getafe 
Calle Madrid, nº 126 
28903 MADRID 
Tfno.: 916245821 – Fax: 916249574 
Correo electrónico: politicaygestion@uc3m.es 
ISSN: 1698-482X 
 
Diseño: Roberto Losada Maestre 
Imprime: 
Copy Red S.A. 
Avda. de Fuenlabrada, 97 
28912 Leganés (Madrid) 
  
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO “POLÍTICA Y GESTIÓN” 
 
UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID 
INSTITUTO DE POLÍTICA Y GOBERNANZA 
(IPOLGOB) 
DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA Y SOCIOLOGÍA 
ÁREA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA Y DE LA ADINISTRACIÓN 
Documento de Trabajo n 17/2009 
 
SILVIO BERLUSCONI’S PARTY OF ONLY CHILDREN: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL OF FORZA ITALIA* 
CLAUDIA MARIOTTI** 
 
 
Abstract: Since it was founded in 1994, Silvio Berlusconi’s party, “Forza Italia”, 
turned over the traditional shape of the Italian political system. Its structure 
doesn’t fit any of the classifications which have been created from the time of 
Duverger on, except perhaps for Angelo Panebianco’s definition (1982) of 
charismatic party. The object of the paper is the parliamentary class of Forza Italia, 
which can be almost totally overlapped to the party class, differently from what 
happened in mass ideological parties. This overlap has two main reasons: the gain 
for the party in having its executives paid directly from public institutions, and
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 above all – the degree of control that the party leader achieves, having the power 
to choose the candidates and - as a result - a huge direct power on the party 
structure itself, making party statutes actually uneffective. The research, conducted 
by interviewing 50 members of the Parliament of Forza Italia with the methods of 
vignettes and open interviews, tries to explain the power relationships between 
party executives, members of the Parliament and the leader. 
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Introduction 
For over forty years, political science international literature dealt with the 
rapid transformations of mass political parties, from Kirchheimer’s reflections 
(1966) on the tendency of parties to de-ideologize their programs, eager to 
represent ampler and heterogeneous segments of electorate (“catch-all parties”), to 
Katz and Mair’s study (1994; recently verified, for Italy, in Bardi, Ignazi and 
Massari 2007) about the increasing power which – in current organizational 
structures – has been reached by central apparatuses and by parliamentary groups 
and elected officials at different governmental levels. 
On the one hand, we can assist to a decline of parties which are territory-
rooted and permanently present locally (element confirmed in many countries by 
the constant decrease in the number of party members, of intermediate level party 
leaders and local offices); on the other hand most of financial and human resources 
tend to concentrate towards the central support of institutional activities and to 
mobilize publicly especially during electoral campaigns, with a massive use of 
mass-media. 
These phenomena, which can be found in most of consolidated 
democracies, present sure peculiarities in the Italian case. 
In fact, the political crisis of 1992-1994 brought firstly to the collapse and 
fragmentation of traditional political parties, particularly those with governing 
responsibilities, and secondly it caused a process of adaptation, re-allocation and 
aggregation of old and new political groups inside an approximately bipolar 
scheme, favored, in all institutional, national and local contexts, by the dynamics of 
the new electoral systems. 
After fifteen years of “transition”, characterized by this “fragmentary 
bipolarism”, the recent evolution of the political system seems to proceed, though 
not always coherently and linearly, towards a prevailing bipartitism, design 
supported by major political actors and embodied by the unification of the main 
parties of the two sides respectively in two new political subjects: the Partito 
Democratico (born in 2007) and Popolo della Libertà (created formally in March 
2009). 
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The method of the research 
The considerations expressed in this paper are the fruit of a research 
conducted with face-to-face interviews on 50 members of Italian Parliament of the 
XV legislature, all belonging to the party Forza Italia. 
The interview was composed of two parts. In the first we used the method 
of vignettes1, in order to investigate the value options of interviewees, bypassing 
the problem of social desirability of the answers (see Mariotti 2008 and 2010). In the 
second part we submitted in-depth interviews concerning the loyalty relationship 
that interviewees had with the party and with the leader, the dynamics of 
candidates selection, the expectations and the critical aspects of their experience in 
Forza Italia. 
This paper makes reference to the second part of in-depth interviews. 
 
Historical overview 
Forza Italia represents a true novelty in Italian and international political 
panorama.  
Founded officially on January 18th 19942, Forza Italia originally meant to 
be just the opposite of the traditional model of mass party. A slim structure, based 
on the strength of the leader (Silvio Berlusconi), and a corporate mindset akin to 
that of Fininvest (Berlusconi’s corporation, which provided fundamental 
organizational resources to the establishment and consolidation of Forza Italia3) are 
                                               
1 Vignettes are short stories about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances, to 
whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond. This technique allows to elicit 
perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes from responses or comments to stories depicting 
scenarios and situations. The investigated value dimensions for the research have been 
universalism/particularism, entrepreneurial attitude and, above all, Madisonian/populist 
conception of democracy. The results have been reported and analyzed in a data matrix. 
2 That is the day in which the constitutive act and the Statute of the party were signed in 
Rome (in via S. Maria dell’Anima 31/A, Berlusconi’s house in Rome) in front of notary 
Francesco Colistra. 
3 Berlusconi’s corporations – among which Fininvest and particularly the advertising branch 
Publitalia – have been an organizational resource of vital importance for Forza Italia, which 
has been able to present itself as brand new, as a non-party with a breaking-through profile 
able to assert itself in the fragile Italian political system. Berlusconi’s corporations, including 
more than 300 companies and producing huge amounts of profits, operate in seven macro-
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among the main features of this party, and make it different from all types and 
classes of parties elaborated in political analysis up to then to describe these 
organizations (Duverger 1951). 
It’s not casual that most of the highest executives of the party-movement 
(at the beginning, in fact, Forza Italia was presented as a movement, precisely to 
highlight the strong anti-party character) came from Fininvest (see Lanza and 
Piazza 2002) or were close anyway to Berlusconi’s companies. Beginning with the 
foundation in Milan, in September 1993, of the association “Alla Ricerca del 
Buongoverno” (meaning “looking for Good Government”) by Giuliano Urbani, 
political analyst and commentator for «Il Giornale», Berlusconi’s family’s 
newspaper. 
The party founded by Berlusconi has been the first European experiment 
of political organization stemming from a private commercial enterprise, and that 
is why it has been defined for a long time as “partito-azienda” (corporate party). 
The electoral success in 1994 which brought Berlusconi to be Italy’s Prime 
Minister and the following failure of the strategy of alliances (particularly with 
Lega Nord), which led to the fall of government and put Forza Italia in the 
opposition side, compelled to rethink and reorganize the structure of the 
movement-party. 
At the end of 1994 a process of restructuration began, promoted by the 
national coordinator of the time, Cesare Previti, in order to face the organizational 
lacks emerged during the previous governing experience. The new Statute, 
approved in October 1994, provided a more structured organization at the local 
level in comparison to the previous Statute. However, Forza Italia continued to 
have a slim structure and a concentration of functions at the top of the party (the 
President). 
The defeat of 1996 elections marked the failure of Previti’s model of 
“militants party”, model which had not been able neither to reduce the internal 
democracy deficit (goal pursued just lukewarmly, not being considered a priority 
                                                                                                                       
areas: Communication, which is composed by TV (Mediaset), cinema (Medusa production 
and distribution) and advertising (Publitalia 80); Publishing (Mondadori, Einaudi, Sperling 
& Kupfer); Distribution; Insurance and Financial Services (Mediolanum and Programma 
Italia); Real Estate (Edilnord 2000, sold to Pirelli & C. Real Estate in 2001); Sport (soccer team 
A.C. Milan) and Group Services. See Poli 2001. 
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by the leader himself), nor to create a structure which could support the leader in 
the selection of a political class for the national and – above all – local level. 
Romano Prodi’s success in 1996 political elections (at the head of a center-
left coalition) represented a crucial turning-point in the history of Forza Italia. In 
fact, Berlusconi entrusted the new national coordinator, Claudio Scajola, with the 
task of writing a new Statute in order to give the party a more solid organization.  
With the new Statute (January 1997), though, Forza Italia maintained two 
features of the original model: personalization of the leadership and the elections-
oriented strategy. 
Between 1996 and 2001, years in which the party remained in the 
opposition, all Forza Italia’s members of Parliament were given a role inside the 
party, beginning with the policy departments. 
Also profiting from being at the opposition, these “Parliamentarian 
executives” spent much of their efforts in creating and developing many of the 
new structures of the party. 
When in 2001 Forza Italia won the elections again, obtaining a resounding 
victory – also thanks to an efficient use of mass-media – almost everybody who 
had a role in the party was called to run governmental positions at different levels. 
In those years, as a consequence, the party institutionalization “freezed”, mainly 
because of the substantial overlap which existed between party executives and 
Parliamentary class. 
In 2006, Berlusconi’s coalition lost elections for a bunch of votes, and began 
a very hard opposition to the weak Prodi’s governing coalition. 
As well as in previous opposition periods, Berlusconi dedicated himself to 
the party. A phase of big change started through two strategies: on the one hand, 
Sandro Bondi4, new national coordinator, ran the membership campaign and 
promoted the organization of several local conventions; on the other hand, Michela 
Vittoria Brambilla5 – new face of the party and overtly supported by Berlusconi 
himself – managed the Circoli della Libertà (“Clubs of Freedom”), aimed to be a 
movement not formally bound to Forza Italia, but inspired and directly tied to 
Berlusconi. 
                                               
4 Current Italian Minister for Cultural Activities since May 8th 2008. 
5 Current Italian Minister of Tourism since May 8th 2009. 
Silvio Berlusconi’s party of only children: the organizational model of Forza Italia 
9 
In a decisive moment for Italian politics, Berlusconi chose to enhance this 
last organizational dimension for his party, basing mostly on it the creation of the 
new political subject, named Popolo della Libertà (“People of Freedom”), the PDL. 
PDL’s birth could be considered as the realization of a project defined long time 
before by Berlusconi.  
 
“All’inizio eravamo un partito essenzialmente giustizialista, poi gradualmente 
siamo diventati il pentapartito, poi, entrando nel Partito Popolare Europeo, 
c’è stato un ulteriore cambiamento. Ora ci si appresta a fare il Partito della 
Libertà e questo è possibile proprio perché la sintesi di tutto è comunque il 
leader. […] La costruzione a destra di un partito liberal-democratico è stato 
l’obiettivo di Berlusconi fin dal 1994”.6 
[a Member of Parliament, March 2007] 
 
What in newspapers was called the “running board revolution”7 was not a 
sudden action by a leader looking for the attention of the media, but a long-studied 
plan defined by Berlusconi in all details. 
 
“Adesso è importante dare vita a questa nuova creatura che sarà la 
protagonista della libertà e della democrazia nei prossimi decenni [...] saremo 
lieti di poter trovare per il nostro paese una direzione di svolta che assicuri la 
democrazia, la libertà [...] partito del popolo della libertà, Popolo della 
Libertà”8 
[from Berlusconi’s “speech of the running board”, Milan, November 18th 2007] 
 
                                               
6 “At the beginning we were essentially a ‘justicialist’ party, then we gradually became the 
‘pentapartito’ [the reference is to the group of five parties, majority of the Parliament during 
the 1980s: they were Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Republicans and Social 
Democrats], then, entering the European Popular Party, a further change occurred. Now we 
are going to make the Party of Freedom, and that is possible just because the synthesis of 
everything is the leader. […] Building a liberal-democratic party on the right was 
Berlusconi’s objective since 1994”. 
7 The reference is to the fact that the new political subject was announced publicly for the 
first time on November 18th 2007 by Berlusconi, who was giving a quick speech in Milan, in 
piazza San Babila, standing on the running board of his car. 
8 “Now it’s important to give the life to this new creature, which is going to be a protagonist 
of freedom and democracy in next decades. […] We’ll be happy to find for our country a 
changing direction which ensures democracy, freedom […]. Party of the People of Freedom, 
People of Freedom”. 
Claudia Mariotti 
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Berlusconi himself, actually, had anticipated the will to create the new 
party on December 2nd 2006, in piazza San Giovanni in Rome. 
 
“Siamo qui per mandare a casa il governo Prodi. Siamo qui per impedire alle 
sinistre di impoverire materialmente e moralmente l’Italia. Siamo qui per 
guardare al futuro per un nuovo grande partito della libertà. Noi siamo il 
popolo della libertà, noi crediamo in un sogno, in una prospettiva che può 
essere garantita solo con la realizzazione del nostro programma liberale 
fondato sui nostri valori di libertà. Nostri, perché non appartengono a un solo 
partito, nostri perché tutti insieme ci crediamo, nostri perché noi tutti insieme 
abbiamo voglia di cambiare questo Paese, di riprendere il cammino delle 
riforme e della crescita. Noi qui oggi, siamo il partito unitario del centro-
destra, siamo già il partito della libertà”9 
[Berlusconi’s speech, Rome, December 2nd 2006] 
 
The Popolo della Libertà was constituted as a federation of political parties 
on February 27th 2008. The foundational congress has been held at Fiera di Roma 
(Rome) on March 29th 2009. 
The PDL – defined a “movement” by Berlusconi and which does not have 
the word “party” in its name, so stressing semantically and symbolically the 
distance from old traditional parties – put together the main political forces of 
Center-Right: Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, la Destra and other minor 
groups10 of Christian Democratic, liberal, social-democratic, centrist and right-
winged inspiration; at the beginning of XVI legislature they formed a single 
Parliamentary Group. 
Today the PDL, which won the political elections of 2008, has the 
government of the country and a solid Parliamentary majority. Nonetheless, 
                                               
9 “We’re here to send Prodi’s government back home. We’re here to prevent the Lefts to 
impoverish Italy materially and morally. We’re here to look at the future to a new great 
party of freedom. We are the People of Freedom, we believe in a dream, in a vision which 
can be ensured only realizing our liberal program, founded on our values of freedom. Ours, 
because they don’t belong to a single party, ours because we believe it all together, ours 
because we all together want to change this country, to regain the path of reforms and of 
growth. We, here today, are the unitary center-right party, we already are the Party of 
Freedom”. 
10 Democrazia cristiana per le Autonomie, Nuovo Psi, Popolari italiani, Azione sociale, 
Riformatori liberali, Partito repubblicano italiano, Circolo delle Libertà, Il Circolo del buon 
governo, Destra libertaria, Cristiano Popolari, Italiani nel Mondo. 
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despite the big consent obtained in the 2008 ballot, several questions and doubts 
over the future of this party remain. 
 
Forza Italia: the party of the only children 
Reviewing carefully political science literature on Forza Italia, it emerges 
that Berlusconi’s party has been object of several definitions in last 16 years. 
At the beginning it was considered a “flash party”, because of its sudden 
and unexpected appearing on the political scene, and also because of the absence 
of structures characteristic of traditional mass parties. 
Forza Italia in 1994 was considered as an impact phenomenon, but 
absolutely temporary, destined to disappear shortly after – as a weak and 
evanescent political group lasting just for a legislature – without affecting Italian 
political system, similarly to the post-World War II experience of L’Uomo 
Qualunque11. 
Despite all the skepticisms of experts and analysts, in March 1994 
Berlusconi’s party won the elections, reaching the government of the country. This 
fact of fundamental importance compelled the political arena to reevaluate 
Berlusconi’s project, which, nonetheless, kept to be underestimated. 
In fact, Forza Italia was still considered a “virtual party” (McCarthy 1995), 
a “ghost party” (Bobbio 1994), a “personal patrimonial party” (Maraffi 1995), also 
taking into account the fragility which manifested itself at the end of 1994 
(particularly with the failure in administrative elections of November). 
The definition then deemed most appropriate was “corporate party”, 
referring to the slim structure of the party, concentrated on the role of its leader 
and featuring an ideological culture similar to that of Berlusconi’s corporation, 
Fininvest, which in those years represented Forza Italia’s main resource. Berlusconi 
                                               
11 L’Uomo Qualunque was a political party, created between 1944 and 1945 around a 
magazine and a vaster social movement, led by Guglielmo Giannini. Its strong opposition to 
the system of parties (that is the origin of the word “qualunquism”, indicating a hard 
distrust towards political parties, considered just as groups of power-seeking individuals) 
brought to a quick end of that experience. 
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referred just to his companies, particularly to Publitalia ’8012 (run by Marcello 
Dell’Utri), in order to design and manage the electoral campaigns and to select the 
candidates for the elections. 
 
“Publitalia non ha contribuito alla campagna elettorale di Forza Italia: 
Publitalia ha fatto la campagna elettorale e ha creato dal nulla il più forte 
partito italiano”13 
[Marcello Dell’Utri, in an interview during the annual convention of 
Publitalia in Montecarlo, September 1994] 
 
This is the reason why, for a long time, the label of “corporate party” 
resisted, because of the transposition of the corporate mindset to the party logics. 
What escaped from analysts’ attention was that Fininvest in particular was 
not a corporation as any other, but it was characterized by a total “Berlusconi-
shaped mindset”, with an evident absence of rules and established roles. There 
were not permanent appointments (or at least they were the minimal part), and 
everyone in Fininvest had to be elastic enough to follow the President in all of his 
ideas, reshaping continuously tasks and responsibilities. 
It means that it was not Forza Italia to be managed following the classic 
corporate model, but it was both Berlusconi’s companies and party to be run in an 
absolutely original way, reflecting in every aspect the personality of the leader. 
Among the most convincing definitions which have been used in these 
years to describe Forza Italia, references can be made to the “catch-all party” 
(Kirchheimer 1966), given the heterogeneousness of the programs and the 
generality of references to values; “populist party” (Meny and Surel 2001), for the 
continuous appeal to the people, considered by the President the only source of 
legitimacy for democratic power (Mariotti 2008); “electoralist party” (Panebianco 
1982; Gunther and Diamond 2002; Lanza and Piazza 2002), which considers the 
main role of the party into taking the President to government, and “charismatic 
party” (Panebianco 1982; Raniolo 2000; Poli 2001). This last definition perhaps 
qualifies the party more than any other: charisma implies the recognition of this 
                                               
12 Publitalia ’80, the advertising concessionaire for Berlusconi’s TV channels, organized the 
selection of the 276 candidates of Forza Italia in the uninominal collegiums for the House of 
Deputies and the Senate in 1994 elections. 
13 “Publitalia didn’t contribute to the electoral campaign of Forza Italia: Publitalia made the 
electoral campaign and created the strongest Italian party from nothing”. 
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exceptional quality by the people in the group, and it’s doubtless – as it emerges 
from the 50 interviews made – that Forza Italia members of Parliament consider 
themselves as being expression of such a party: 
“Il nostro è un partito leaderistico, carismatico”14.  
[a Member of Parliament, August 2007] 
 
“Forza Italia è un partito dichiaratamente leaderistico, anche se ora si sta un 
po’ strutturando. Cioè [per un candidato] conta che il tuo territorio ti gradisca, 
ma conta sempre l’opinione del leader carismatico”15.  
[a Member of Parliament, July 2007] 
 
In fact, to better understand Forza Italia it is important to analyze not only 
how the party was studied so far, but also how it is self-perceived by its leader and 
by its ruling class. 
In 1994 the national coordinator of the time, Previti, launched – following a 
Berlusconi’s idea – the “militants party”. He presented a Statute in which most of 
the elective offices were chosen at the base, involving clubs and members, through 
a system of primaries16. Nonetheless, not considering – neither him nor the 
President – the times mature for such a change, he froze the Statute in favor of a 
totally top-driven organization, through a number of top-down appointments 
which had always Berlusconi as last referee17.  
                                               
14 “Ours is a leaderistic, charismatic party”. 
15 “Forza Italia is an avowedly leaderistic party, even though now it is partly structuring 
itself; i.e. [for a candidate] it is important to be appreciated by the territory, but it is always 
important the charismatic leader’s opinion”. 
16 Following the division of Italian territory in 475 uninominal collegiums for the House of 
Deputies, the Statute provided a structuration having in the electoral collegiums its basic 
unit. In every collegium, through procedures of popular election with the involvement of 
club members and the registered electors of Forza Italia, the candidates should have been 
chosen. Primary elections, then, should have individuated the 475 candidates, who should 
have had the function of delegates for the collegiums, i.e. of party executives at the local 
level, in addition to the guarantee to participate to the national convention in the spring of 
1995 for the election of the Presidency committee and of the executive group of the party. 
17 The President appointed the members of the Presidency committee and the national 
coordinator; the latter, in agreement with the President, appointed the regional 
coordinators, who in their turn appointed their directive organs and the delegates for 
collegiums. Since December 1994, for a year, the membership drive was suspended, going 
Claudia Mariotti 
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After the defeat in 1996, Berlusconi entrusted Scajola (appointed national 
coordinator) with the task of structuring Forza Italia in the territory. Scajola, 
through the 1997 Statute and the First Congress of 1998, managed to 
institutionalize the huge power of the leader, making all the strategic executive 
offices of the party be appointed by the President or by organs appointed by him, 
although he introduced some elements of internal democracy relating essentially to 
the local levels, up to the provincial coordinators. 
 
“Teoricamente c’è democrazia fino al potere provinciale, ma è una 
democrazia, se si guarda anche allo statuto, con pochi poteri perché poi 
decide tutto dal coordinamento regionale in su -  che è nominato dal leader”18. 
[a Member of Parliament, March 2007] 
 
Although Berlusconi wanted a more locally organized party in order to 
achieve better electoral performances at the local level, betting on candidates who 
could be expression of territories, he didn’t want to change the nature of his 
political creature, at all. 
That is why, in 2000, at the Congress of Assago, he launched the “party of 
the people”: 
 
“Cominciamo dunque i nostri lavori, i lavori di questo nostro partito che se 
volessimo definirlo come lo definirebbero gli studiosi di politica dovremmo 
chiamare un partito di valori e di programma. Se volessimo collocarlo 
geograficamente diremmo che è un partito di centro, il centro del sistema 
politico italiano. È un partito liberale, ma non elitario, anzi un partito 
liberaldemocratico popolare, è un partito cattolico ma non confessionale, è un 
partito laico ma non intollerante e laicista, è un partito nazionale ma non 
centralista. È insomma un partito che vuole darsi un nome molto semplice, e 
                                                                                                                       
against articles 2 and 3 of the January 18th Statute, and confirming Previti and Berlusconi’s 
preference for a party in which the executives, also from an organizational point of view, 
were the members of Parliament. 
18 “In theory there is democracy up to the provincial level, but it’s a democracy, if we look at 
the Statute, with just a few powers, because afterwards everything is decided from the 
regional coordination to the top, and those are appointed by the leader”. 
Silvio Berlusconi’s party of only children: the organizational model of Forza Italia 
15 
che per quello che pensiamo noi sarebbe lieto di essere chiamato in modo 
molto semplice: il partito della gente”19.  
[Silvio Berlusconi, Congress of Assago, 2000] 
 
Therefore, Forza Italia became a two-dimensions party: one, preponderant, 
of the “party of the people”, in which it was enhanced the direct relationship – not 
mediated by any structure – between the leader and his people, managed 
autonomously by Berlusconi. The other, organizational, of the “non-party party”, 
in which members of Parliament, for the first time, got into the structure of Forza 
Italia – holding executive roles (each of them was put to head a department) 
absolutely lacking authority – giving life to a “party of the only children”, 
extremely less important for Berlusconi than the party of the people.  
 
“[Un partito] che nasce da un leader carismatico che parla direttamente con la 
gente, bypassando ogni struttura di partito, compresi i dipartimenti - oggi io 
sono responsabile di un dipartimento - bypassando i dipartimenti, 
chiaramente necessita di un partito non partito. E’ una scelta strategica, ma 
anche accettata da noi [parlamentari], perché questo è il partito della gente 
che ama Berlusconi e con un partito così il leader deve avere le mani libere”20. 
[a Member of Parliament, March 2007] 
 
The party of the only children is so defined – by some Forza Italia 
Members of Parliament themselves – because of the inner dynamics which qualify 
it until the dissolution of the party into the PDL. 
Its characteristics are essentially five: 
1. Overlap between Parliamentary and party offices; 
                                               
19 “Let’s begin our works, the works of our party, whom we could call – as political scholars 
would – a ‘party of values and of program’. If we had to collocate it geographically we’d say 
it is a Center party, the center of Italian political system. It’s a liberal party, but not elitist, 
rather it’s a liberal-democratic popular party; Catholic, but not confessional; laic, but not 
intolerant and ‘laicist’; it’s national party, but not centralist. To sum up it’s party whose 
name is very simple, and which – for what we think – would be glad to be called in a very 
simple way: the party of the people”. 
20 “[A party] which was born by a charismatic leader who talks directly to the people, 
bypassing every party structure, including departments – today I’m in charge of a 
department – bypassing the departments, clearly needs a ‘non-party party’. It’s a strategic 
choice, accepted by us [members of Parliament] as well, because this is the party of the 
people who love Berlusconi, and in a party like this the leader must have his hands free”. 
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2. Selection of the candidates as personal choice of the leader; 
3. Love towards the leader, who becomes like a father whom they 
don’t want to disappoint; 
4. Absolute trust in the leader; 
5. Inexistent relationships between MPs. 
As mentioned before, Forza Italia has always been characterized by an 
almost total overlap between the offices of Members of Parliament and party 
executives. This overlap has always been a precise choice of the leader for two 
main reasons. The first, of sheer economic character, relates to the lower expenses, 
which on the contrary turn into gain for the party. Berlusconi, instead of paying 
party executives, gives the offices directly to his MPs – gratifying them through 
prestigiously named role – and they , in addition to dedicating themselves 
passionately to curry the leader’s favor, use as resources also their own assistants 
(paid as well by the State, accordingly with the benefits tied to Members of 
Parliament’s status). In that way Berlusconi exploits State economic resources as 
they were his own patrimony, dispensing rewards (the office of national or 
European Member of Parliament, or of regional deputy) to his liking; without 
considering the objective advantage that the party receives from its elected officials 
at the various levels, that can be quantified to about 20% of their salaries ending 
directly to the party21. 
The second reason which induced the leader to the overlap of offices is, 
instead, of political concern. Controlling his MPs – through the system of rewards 
which we will talk of below – Berlusconi controls directly also the party, so 
limiting the risk of internal oppositions which could curb his power. 
The selection of candidates is perhaps the most interesting aspect which 
characterizes this peculiar party. The Statute analysis, in this case, is not sufficient, 
because the norms often are ignored in favor of praxis. The 1997 Statute, anyway, 
provided an almost total discretion, in the selection of candidates, for the leader 
and his Presidency committee, which make their choices on the base of the 
recommendations by the regional coordinators. 
                                               
21 It must be said the overlap of offices, in recent years, became a common practice also for 
the other parties of the Italian political system (for instance as regards the habit of taking a 
percentage of the salary of elected officials), however much, in most cases, not as much as in 
Forza Italia. 
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Through in-depth interviews (in most cases they lasted more than one 
hour and a half) we managed to collect the direct experiences of the MPs and to 
reconstruct partially the dynamics of this fundamental passage. 
Candidates seem to be chosen exclusively by the leader at his discretion, 
and they are indisputable. 
They who wish to be candidate – in “safe positions”, considering the close 
party lists Italian electoral system – try in every way to establish a direct contact 
with the leader or with the national coordinator in the days before the commitment 
of the lists, in order to be reassured or to try to convince the President to be 
presented as candidates, even only to be sure he doesn’t forget previous 
agreements. Some might even wait out of his house, looking for the best moment 
to approach him (after or before someone else). 
Analyzing Forza Italia parliamentary class since 1994 up to now, we can 
observe how Berlusconi changed his criteria of choice with time. At the beginning 
he recruited eminent people from civil society coming from different professional 
sectors, characterized by their non-involvement with politics. Afterwards, with the 
appointment of Scajola as national coordinator, the followed criteria were mainly 
two: on the one hand, the recruitment of ex professional politicians, mostly of 
Christian Democratic (from which Scajola himself had come) and Socialist areas22; 
on the other hand, the fidelity and the personal connection to the leader, in 
addition to the enhancement of qualities in the communication field (Lanza and 
Piazza 2002). In XV and XVI legislatures, the second criterion seems to prevail on 
the first, through major consideration of personal relationships and degree of 
fidelity shown to the leader. 
What is particularly striking in the interviews made is the deep passion 
which most of MPs show towards their President. Berlusconi is deemed as the 
charismatic leader who allows people standing by him to rise, but it’s not just that; 
every interviewee showed the desire to please the leader and not to disappoint 
him, just as with a parent. Their goal is to favor and help the leader as much as 
they can, and what they do both in the Parliament and in the party aims to reach 
this goal. The same structure of the party is run with enthusiasm not for internal 
                                               
22 In XIV legislature over 60% of Forza Italia Members of Parliament (in both the House and 
the Senate) came from parties of the “First Republic”, and among them the Christian 
Democratic component was the most numerous (Lanza and Piazza 2002). 
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necessities of the executives or external necessities of electors, but to follow the 
wishes of the President. 
 
“Cerchiamo di pensare a ciò che il leader ha potuto fare per tutti noi, cercando 
di dire cosa possiamo fare tutti noi per il leader! Quindi, ora, cercando di 
radicare il partito sul territorio, di renderlo visibile in tutti i comuni d’Italia, di 
dargli quel senso di democrazia di base, eleggendo tutti i rappresentanti e 
mantenendo l’aspetto verticista perché un leader è un leader e non si può 
cambiare, quindi democrazia larga e diffusa a livello comunale e provinciale e 
poi a stringere perché sennò poi non potrebbe funzionare”23.  
[a Member of Parliament, August 2007] 
 
Each of the interviewees is aware to have a gratitude debt towards the 
President, and this gratitude ties them even more closely to him. The President has 
– or has had anyway – a direct relationship with each of them, nobody excluded. 
Berlusconi, despite his role, manages to take care of a staggering number of 
personal relations, gratifying every time his interlocutor. 
Most of interviewees are aware to have a seat in Parliament just thanks to 
Berlusconi, not having – for an explicit want of Berlusconi, who privileges other 
criteria in the selection of candidates (see point 2) – a significant number of votes to 
present, or particularly evident qualities in order to justify their position. 
 
“E’ l’unico caso al mondo in cui è il leader che porta i voti al partito, 
contrariamente a tutti gli altri leader di partito che sanno prendere i voti del 
partito. Gli altri partiti hanno loro i voti e diventa leader chi riesce a prendere 
più voti di questo partito. Da noi i voti sono di Berlusconi e questa è la vera 
anomalia”24. 
                                               
23 “We try to think bearing in mind what the leader made for us all, trying to tell what we all 
can do for the leader. So, now, try to root the party in the territory, make it visible in all 
Italian municipalities, give it a sense of base democracy, electing all representatives and 
maintain the top-down design, because a leader is a leader and you cannot change that, so 
large and diffused democracy at the base on municipal and provincial levels, and then 
tightening, because otherwise it couldn’t work”. 
24 “It’s the only case in the world where the leader brings votes to the party, when all other 
leaders on the contrary can take votes from the party. Other parties have their own votes, 
and leader becomes who’s able to take most of these votes. In our party the votes are 
Berlusconi’s, and this is the true anomaly”. 
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[a Member of Parliament, March 2007] 
 
The party of the only children characterizes itself also for the relationship 
of extreme trust which ties the MPs to the leader. Interviewees admit that they 
must have an elastic mindset to take in immediately the ideas of the leader, who – 
gifted with fantasy and geniality and having a direct relationship with the people – 
expresses his insights impromptu, usually in public, without a previous 
confrontation with the party. That is why the trust in the President is a 
fundamental characteristic. The parliamentary class is called to support the 
thoughts and the actions of the leader, often without having precise information 
and, sometimes, even not agreeing. 
 
“Mi sono trovato numerosissime volte a sapere delle iniziative di Berlusconi 
dai giornalisti e a sostenerle senza neanche sapere di cosa si trattasse. In 
alcuni casi – me ne vergogno un po’- ho difeso l’operato di Berlusconi pur 
disapprovandolo, perché credevo di doverlo difendere anche se aveva 
sbagliato perché le cose giuste che faceva erano talmente superiori a quelle 
sbagliate da poterlo giustificare”25. 
[a Member of Parliament, February 2009] 
 
The direct relationship with the leader – who controls and decides 
everything – implies that MPs are not incentivized to develop a corps-spirit, a 
sense of common belonging. Each of them is convinced to have a special tie with 
Berlusconi, and for this reason they are in Forza Italia. Everyone refers directly to 
the President and, as a result, doesn’t need the others, with whom dynamics of 
jealousy often develop. The relationship which establishes between them is of 
coexistence, but not of cohabitation. Furthermore, the feeling which ties them to 
the leader is so strong that they tend to give vent to frustrations – maybe for a bad 
management of the party – on his close entourage – which has a very limited 
decisional power – rather than on the leader, who is always justified. 
 
                                               
25 “I found myself several times to know about Berlusconi’s initiatives from journalists and 
to support them without even knowing what it was about. In some cases – I’m a bit 
ashamed for that – I defended Berlusconi’s acts even disagreeing with that, as I felt I had to 
defend him although he was wrong, because the right things he did were so superior to the 
wrong ones to be able to justify him”. 
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In quel momento, non per volontà di Berlusconi, ma di Scajola si decise di 
trasformarlo [Forza Italia] in partito. Ma fu un errore. Di Scajola”26.  
[a Member of Parliament, July 2007] 
 
“Se dicessi che va tutto bene, direi una fesseria! Soprattutto nelle ultime 
elezioni politiche con un sistema elettorale proporzionale sono state 
privilegiate le persone vicine all’apparato. Questo certo non per colpa di 
Berlusconi, ma per i suoi rappresentanti a livello regionale [i coordinatori 
regionali sono nominati da Berlusconi]; io sono una vittima di questo. Ma non 
per colpa di Berlusconi [...] è stato consigliato male!”27. 
[a Member of Parliament, August 2007] 
 
It must be added that it is Berlusconi himself who doesn’t incentivize the 
aggregative dynamics inside the party, avoiding for example the chance of creation 
of internal groups which would compel him to confront with the party, limiting, 
even partially, his power. 
 
“Se lui avesse avuto i colonnelli, li richiamava ogni volta che c’era un 
problema e gli diceva ‘Ooh!’. Ma se ciascuno di noi avesse potuto fare 
riferimento ad un colonnello invece di sentirci tutti figli unici… Perché lui  
[Berlusconi] poi questo ha fatto. Ha creato il “partito della gente” e poi c’ha il 
“partito dei figli unici” e i figli unici non fanno famiglia!”28. 
[a Member of Parliament, March 2007] 
 
From the interviews made, it is evident that every Forza Italia MP feels 
fully a “child” – proud of his father – of Berlusconi, but definitely not “brother” of 
his party colleagues, with whom he refuses to confront because he somehow 
prefers to ignore their existence. 
                                               
26 “In that moment, not for Berlusconi’s will, but because of Scajola it was decided to 
transform [Forza Italia] into a party. But it was a mistake. Of Scajola”. 
27 “If I said everything is all right, I would say something stupid! Above all in last political 
elections, with a proportional electoral system, people near to the apparatus have been 
privileged. This was definitely not Berlusconi’s fault, but for his representatives at the 
regional level [regional coordinators are appointed by Berlusconi]; I am a victim of this. But 
it’s not Berlusconi’s fault […] he has been badly advised!”.  
28 “If he had had the colonels, he could recall them every time there was a problem saying: 
«Ooh!». But if each of us could have been able to refer to a colonel instead of feeling all only 
children… Because he [Berlusconi] did that. He created the ‘party of the people’, and then 
he has the ‘party of the only children’, and the only children don’t make a family!”. 
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Therefore Forza Italia’s family is absolutely patriarchal and characterized by all 
“only children”. 
 
The crisis of the party of the only children: the Popolo della Libertà 
The party of the only children – as explained in the previous paragraph – 
characterizes itself, among other things, for a direct tie of MPs/party executives to 
the leader and for the absence of consolidated connections and alliances with 
colleagues. 
The Popolo della Libertà (PDL), born from the union of Forza Italia and 
Alleanza Nazionale (in addition to other small center-right groups), seems to 
change this picture, strongly promoted by Berlusconi, on which Forza Italia always 
based itself. 
Through an analysis of the Statutes of the three parties (Forza Italia, 
Alleanza Nazionale, Popolo della Libertà) it emerges how Berlusconi’s party had a 
clearly predominant role as source of inspiration for the new Statute. 
The charismatic character of PDL is more accentuated than in Forza Italia. 
The President’s office, for instance, which in Forza Italia lasted three years, in the 
PDL does not have a term. There isn’t any deadline. 
To create most of the concerns, though, there are internal groups, 
considered by Mario Valducci a “heritage of ex-AN members”29, and the 
relationship between the leader and the organization. 
The debate on internal groups shed a light upon the difficult cohabitation 
between Gianfranco Fini and Berlusconi, and put Berlusconi’s only children off 
their isolation, making them to fear this new reality which tries to gain space in the 
party. On January 27th 2010, Sandro Bondi, one of the three national coordinators, 
opened a debate on the pages of «Il Giornale», on which he expressed his concerns 
about the possible drift towards the consolidation of these internal groups in the 
PDL, and about the risk that they could turn Berlusconi’s design, typical of Forza 
Italia, over. 
 
“La mia preoccupazione, tuttavia, è che vi sono delle posizioni anche 
all’interno del nostro partito che non vanno, secondo me, nella direzione per 
                                               
29 Co-founder of Forza Italia and Member of Parliament. The quotation is reported in an 
interview published in «L’Opinione», February 4th 2010. 
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cui il presidente Silvio Berlusconi ha fondato prima Forza Italia e poi il Popolo 
della Libertà. […]Sarebbe un errore e un curioso paradosso se, in coincidenza 
del punto più alto della sua forza politica e del grado di consenso di cui gode 
nel Paese, una certa nomenclatura politica si sentisse abilitata a fare da sé, a 
rivendicare un’autonomia che getta un’ombra sul futuro”30. 
[Sandro Bondi , «Il Giornale», January 27th 2010] 
 
The debate continued with the interventions of various MPs (mostly of the 
Forza Italia area), among which the ex national coordinator Cicchitto, who 
threatened, against the AN dissidents, to create – if necessary – a huge internal 
group of ex Forza Italia members ready to isolate them; and Scajola, who declared 
himself against these internal groups, but in favor of a party which “makes 
Berlusconi’s charismatic leadership to cohabitate with an organization of members, 
rooted in the territory and open to the lively contributions of electors“31. 
Besides the problem of internal groups32, Berlusconi knows that PDL is 
living a crucial phase of its history, and is aware that his control on the party is not 
total and undisputable as it was in Forza Italia. 
The launch of “Paladini della Libertà” (“Paladins of Freedom”) is a first 
answer to the power games inside the PDL, manifesting themselves also in the 
abnormal proliferation of associations and foundations. But the day of reckoning 
seems near, and after the regional elections of March 2010, Berlusconi could re-
establish vigorously the structure of the party of the only children. 
 
 
                                               
30 “My concern, though, is that there are some positions also inside our party, which, in my 
opinion, don’t go in the direction for which the President Silvio Berlusconi founded Forza 
Italia firstly and then the Popolo della Libertà. […] It would be a mistake and a curious 
paradox if, in coincidence of the highest point of its political strength and consent which it 
enjoys in the country, a certain political nomenclature felt allowed to do on its own, to claim 
an autonomy which puts a shadow on the future”.    
31 «Il Giornale», February 5th 2010. 
32 Bruno Murgia, deputy of PDL, ex member of AN, talks of three main internal groups 
inside PDL. The first is tied to Fini, willing to build a right post-ideological European party; 
the second gathers the so-called “Bismarckiani”, which put together Giulio Tremonti, 
Maurizio Sacconi, Gianni Alemanno and others, around the idea of a popular party with a 
special Catholic inspiration; the third, composed of all those strictly connected to Berlusconi 
(Gasparri, Quagliariello, Verdini, etc.). 
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APPENDIX 
Interviewed Members of Italian Parliament 
 
DEPUTIES 
On. Maria Teresa Armosino 
On. Simone Baldelli 
On. Isabella Bertolini 
On. Mara Carfagna 
On. Gabriella Carlucci 
On. Giuseppe Cossiga 
On. Benedetto Della Vedova 
On. Manuela Di Centa 
On. Luigi Fabbri 
On. Gregorio Fontana 
On. Daniele Galli 
On. Elisabetta Gardini 
On Sestino Giacomoni 
On. Francesco Maria Giro 
On. Giorgio Lainati 
On. Luigi Lazzari 
On. Mistrello Destro 
On. Gabriella Mondello 
On. Osvaldo Napoli 
On. Antonio Palmieri 
On. Patrizia Paoletti Tangheroni 
On. Paola Pelino 
On. Guglielmo Picchi 
On. Mauro Pili 
On. Dario Rivolta 
On. Massimo Romagnoli 
On. Iole Santelli 
On. Angelo Santori 
On. Angelo Maria Sanza 
On. Giorgio Simeoni 
On. Roberto Tortoli 
On. Mario Valducci 
On. Denis Verdini  
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SENATORS 
Sen. Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati 
Sen. Paolo Amato 
Sen. Roberto Antonione 
Sen. Massimo Baldini 
Sen. Laura Bianconi 
Sen. Anna Cinzia Bonfrisco 
Sen. Maria Burani Procaccini 
Sen. Giampiero Carlo Cantoni 
Sen. Valerio Carrara 
Sen. Ombretta Colli 
Sen. Mario Ferrara 
Sen. Antonio Gentile 
Sen. Cosimo Izzo 
Sen. Giulio Marini 
Sen. Gaetano Quagliariello 
Sen. Maurizio Sacconi 
Sen. Giorgio Celio Stracquadanio 
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